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Not To Be «Looked At»! 




ABSTRACT: Universally regarded as one of the twentieth century’s most subversive pièces, the Dead Class epitomises Tadeusz Kantor’s 
concept of what theatre (and, more generally, art) could and should be. In the attempt to eliminate any distance between the stage and the 
auditorium, between actors and spectators, the Polish artist reflected on how to do away with the traditional distinction between the reality of 
everyday life and the (alleged) unreality of theatrical performances. Staging daily and trivial objects played a crucial role in this artistic strategy. 
Kantor was fascinated, in particular, by hyperrealistic dummies which seem to have more to do with Wunderkammern and fairground booths 
than with so-called «high» art. By focusing on the material the Dead Class mannequins are made of (namely, wax), the article delves deep 
into Kantor’s essays and manifestos, exploring the theoretical reasons underlying his aesthetics of theatre.
KEY WORDS: Kantor, Hyperrealism, Phenomenology, Unreality, Wax mannequins, Bio-Objects.
¡Para no ser «contemplado»! Lo real y lo irreal en la estética del teatro de Kantor
RESUMEN: Universalmente reconocida como una de las obras más subversivas del siglo XX, La clase muerta ejemplifica el concepto de lo 
que, según Tadeusz Kantor, podría y debería ser el teatro (y, más en general, el arte). En el intento de eliminar toda distancia entre escenario 
y auditorio, entre actores y espectadores, el artista polaco reflexionó sobre cómo eliminar la distinción tradicional entre la realidad cotidiana 
y la (presunta) irrealidad de las actuaciones teatrales. La puesta en escena de objetos triviales y cotidianos desempeñó un papel crucial en 
esta estrategia artística. A Kantor le fascinaban, en particular, los maniquíes hiperrealistas que parecen tener más que ver con Wunderkam-
mern y casetas de feria que con el «arte elevado». Centrándose  en el material del que están hechos los maniquíes de La clase muerta (en 
concreto, la cera), este artículo profundiza en los ensayos y manifiestos de Kantor, para explorar las razones teóricas que subyacen a su 
estética del teatro.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Kantor, Hiperrealismo, Fenomenología, Irrealidad, Maniquíes de cera, Bio-objetos.
Krakow, November 15, 1975. Between the Krzysztofory Gallery’s claustrophobic brick walls, plunged into the dark, cavern-
ous depths of a windowless medieval basement, Tadeusz Kantor’s Dead Class premieres. Unceremoniously sitting on simple 
and rather uncomfortable chairs, the audience is stunned by an enigmatically bleak scene consisting of a few rows of modest 
wooden school benches. Defining it as a «set design» seems to be an exaggeration, for the wings are nothing more than the 
naked room’s walls, and the performance space is separated from the auditorium by a mere rope suspended on poles, last 
bastion of the traditional division between stage and auditorium. A poor, inconsistent, and essentially self-negating bastion, 
though, as it suggests the exact opposite of what it should be intended for: it sets boundaries which it cannot (and even does 
not want to) protect; it draws a demarcation line while, at the same time, it encourages to cross it; it erects what is supposed 
to be an impassable barrier, but no safety system has ever been easier to bypass.
CONTE, Pietro: «Not To Be “Looked At”! Reality and Unreality in Kantor’s Aesthetics of Theatre», Boletín de Arte, n.º 37, Departamento de Historia del Arte, 
Universidad de Málaga, 2016, pp. 49-57, ISSN: 0211-8483.
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and time – something that could not concern or even affect 
them: «A theatre piece should not be “looked at”!» (Kantor, 
1942-1944: 37). Trying to eliminate any distance between 
the concrete reality of the auditorium and the audience on 
the one hand and the particular «unreality» (we shall return to 
this expression further ahead) of staging and acting on the 
other, Kantor tirelessly challenges the traditional idea of the-
atre as a mere pastime and entertainment. He aims to cross 
the threshold between the stage and the audience, between 
the fictional realm of the drama and the physical reality of the 
theatre in which the drama is being performed: «The creation 
of reality, which is as concrete as the auditorium, rather than 
the creation of illusion, which makes the audience feel safe, 
should be the ultimate goal on stage. The drama on stage 
must be created, rather than take place. It must develop in 
front of the audience. The drama is being created» (Kantor, 
1942-1944: 37).
The choice of «poor objects» (Kantor, 1963: 74), which 
we are all well-accustomed to by virtue of repetitious and 
monotonous use, is intended to bring out their latent seman-
tic potentialities and unusual symbolic meanings, which can 
appear only through a truly creative act. To both actors and 
spectators – terms which Kantor, significantly, does not like, 
as he prefers to consider them «players» (Bablet, 1977: 23) 
– the «spectacle» should always concern our everyday life, 
not the imaginary life of the characters of a drama supposed 
to be mimetically translated into the visual «language» of the 
scene: we, and not alleged others, are personally involved 
in the play.
Kantor’s fierce dispute against sophisticated stage 
designs, costumes, and a theatre which «protrudes use-
lessly from concrete reality» is rooted in the conviction that 
true art is only achievable «by including the reality of fic-
tion in the reality of life». The image should be intermingled 
with reality, or rather the (alleged) scene fiction should give 
way to a new form of reality – the theatrical reality, in which 
nothing separates the actors from the audience: «Drama is 
reality. All that happens in drama is real and true» (Kantor, 
1942-1944: 34-36). This struggle against naturalism as a 
flat reproduction of reality, espoused by Kantor and applied 
to the field of performative arts, culminates in the concep-
tion of an «autonomous theatre» capable of overcoming the 
tedious tautology and the mediocre illustration of a merely 
mimetic art.
A few benches and a rope to change the fate of con-
temporary theatre. Humble and trivial objects selected by 
Kantor precisely because of their seemingly so unattractive 
features. The purpose is clear: to bring unusual and diso-
rienting nuances to everyday, well-known, and even banal 
things, thus modifying the meaning of the whole representa-
tion and, more generally, of the concept of theatrical art it-
self. Removing objects from their original contexts, depriving 
them of their ordinary functions and giving their physical ex-
istence a meta-physical value – this is what the Polish theatre 
reformer aims at:
To me, an object became a sign for the problem of bounda-
ries in art. […] An object, alien and undefinable by our minds, 
is fascinating. The desire to possess it and all attempts to im-
itate it or represent it are futile and vain. It must be «touched» 
in a different manner. This process – this ritual – is childishly 
simple: the object must be wrenched from its life’s conditions 
and functions, left alone without a description that would give 
it a meaning: it must be left alone (Kantor, 1993: 72).
The Dead Class is this ritual, this séance dramatique, 
as the work’s subtitle sounds like. The word séance conveys 
the idea of carrying out, of developing, of a work in progress. 
In its evident psychoanalytical connotation it refers to an in-
tense, demanding activity. More precisely: a shared activity. 
We attend theatre performances, but we participate and are 
involved in a séance. By ritually manipulating all-too-famil-
iar objects, Kantor emphasises the performative and vital 
essence of theatre, stressing how important it is to get the 
audience directly and concretely involved in the stage play, 
making it an integral part of a spectacle which should have 
nothing to do with a passive and leisurely spectare.
Within this context, the humblest objects turn out to 
be also the most suited to erase that distance which seems 
to be – as Moritz Geiger (1913: 632) already pointed out – 
an essential condition of possibility for contemplation and 
aesthetic enjoyment: «While contemplating a painting, a 
landscape, the features of a man, a poem, or a symphony, 
there is always a distance between the I and the object». 
Kantor’s attempt is precisely to prevent the audience from 
merely contemplating the theatrical pieces with a distant 
and detached attitude, as if they were looking at something 
unfolding in a radically different (i.e. fictional, unreal) space 
51































Pondering on the notion of présentification, Jean-
Pierre Vernant claims that the communication between the 
living and the dead requires:
A «grasp» of the person […], some means to act upon it. If 
the person is not physically present, then one can operate 
through the mediation of «substitutes» or «equivalents» which 
presentify the person in a concretely manipulable form, even 
when it does not belong to this world anymore. Without re-
sembling him, the equivalent is capable of presenting some-
one, of taking his place in the game of social exchanges. It 
does so not by virtue of similarity with the external aspect of 
the person (as in a portrait), but through a sharing in «value», 
a concordance in the matter of qualities tied to prestige (Ver-
nant, 1990: 75).
A means is needed to make the absents present, to 
evoke the dead through a certain «sharing in “value”». Then 
the class suddenly empties, the elderly students disappear 
somewhere behind the scenes, before finally reappearing on 
stage from the depths of their memory, which are the depths 
of our own memory as well:
They are all carrying small children, like little corpses... Some 
of these are swaying inertly, clinging with a desperate move-
ment, hanging, trailing, as if they were the remorse of con-
science, curling up at the actors’ feet, as if creeping over 
these metamorphosed specimens... human creatures una-
shamedly exhibiting the secrets of their past… with the ex-
crescences of their own childhood (Kantor, 1983: 36) [1].
It is the grande entrée of the famous Dead Class man-
nequins: «bio-objects», as Kantor defines them, perfectly 
suited to act as means of evocation, as they are ambiguous 
and even paradoxical in being neither objects nor subjects, 
or rather, enigmatically, objects and subjects at the same 
time. These dummies re-presenting – i.e. presentifying – chil-
dren from the past seem to be symbiotic with the worn-out 
funeral clothes of the old people carrying them: «They are the 
larvae of those old people, they store up their entire memory 
of childhood, rejected and forgotten out of indifference, be-
cause of the remorseless practicality of everyday life, which 
deprives us of the means of grasping our lives as a whole» 
(Kantor, 2002: 42-43).
Silence in the hall. It is showtime. When looking at the 
actors entering the stage, at those old people slowly taking 
their seats on those school benches which in the past had 
been theirs (or, more precisely, could have been theirs), the 
audience feels there is no border or distance anymore be-
tween themselves and the actors: we look at the others, but 
we see ourselves as if reflected in a mirror, and that class-
room suddenly becomes our classroom, those dusty books 
lying abandoned on the floor and written in who knows what 
language become our books, above and beyond any pos-
sible difference. We are the students who are asked ques-
tions, we are the ones raising the hands to answer: we are the 
dead class. We can remember those youthful days in which 
everything seemed to be timeless because we have lived 
them as well, because even before the individual memory of 
that particular child there is the memory of the child tout-court 
– a memory which knows neither first names nor surnames, a 
mythical memory, «since, after all, the typical is the mythical», 
to quote Thomas Mann’s Joseph and His Brothers (1942: 6).
Thus, instead of memories, it would be more appro-
priate to speak of re-evocations: what really counts is not 
whether we have ever been asked the same questions in the 
past, whether our benches had precisely the same form and 
colour as in Kantor’s play or whether our classroom walls 
were similarly made of bare bricks. Instead, what matters 
here most is the very fact that we as well were once asked, 
sat on a school bench and had a classroom. While attend-
ing the Dead Class, the questions we hear, the classroom 
benches and the walls we look at, remind us of the questions 
we were once asked, of the benches we once sat on, and 
of the walls we once looked at in moments of distraction. 
It matters little whether or not we remember them exactly, 
whether or not we are able to recall the precise questions 
we were unable to answer, or whether or not we can still 
say what colour our benches were; what is crucial is that 
the particular questions, the particular benches, and the par-
ticular walls of Kantor’s Dead Class act as images, i.e. as 
reference structures capable of presentifying whom (or what) 
is not present anymore. The analogical power of images – 
their distinctive as-if quality – lies in the ability to evoke the 
absents, to make them present, to presentify them. And the 
absents, in Kantor’s play, are no one but ourselves, those 
children in a class which died long ago, and which can be 
re-evoked precisely because of its being dead. 
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both are perfect images of ourselves, and yet this proximity 
hints at an unbridgeable distance and difference – that dis-
tance, that difference which is the condition of possibility of 
the image itself1.
Kantor’s «Theatre of Death» is based on the conviction 
that «the concept of life can be vindicated in art only through 
the absence of life in its conventional sense» (Kantor, 1975: 
110). If in Kantor’s poetics of the bio-objects «the actor is 
what the objects makes him, that is an object» (Romanska, 
2004: 272), the opposite also holds true, i.e. the object – in 
this case, the mannequin – is what the actor makes it, that 
is, a subject. Physically hampered by the mannequin, the 
actor is forced to unnatural, mechanical movements which 
make him look like an automaton. Conversely, the manne-
quin, thanks to the symbiosis with its bearer, gains what it 
was still lacking, that is, the ability to move. The living sud-
denly becomes dead, whereas the dead suddenly acquires 
the features of the living: unheimlich, as Ernst Jentsch called 
(over a decade before Sigmund Freud’s famous essay on 
The Uncanny) the feeling elicited by a disturbing confusion 
about the animate or inanimate nature of what we are look-
ing at. Jentsch explicitly linked the uncanny to aesthetics 
when he remarked that «true art, in wise moderation, avoids 
the absolute and complete imitation of nature and living be-
ings, well knowing that such an imitation can easily produce 
uneasiness» (Jentsch, 1906: 12). The unpleasant impression 
is prompted by a «lack of orientation» (1906: 8) which makes 
it impossible to decide if we are standing in front of a statue 
or a real person, thus causing disorientation and rising above 
the doubt «as to whether an apparently living being is ani-
mate and, conversely, as to whether a lifeless object may not 
in fact be animate» (1906: 11)2.
Mentioning the notion of unheimlich as elaborated by 
both Jentsch and Freud is not irrelevant: the former empha-
sizes that «the truer to nature the formal reproduction, the 
more strongly will the uncanny effect also make its appear-
ance» (Jentsch, 1906: 12), whereas the latter, as a corollary 
to Jentsch’s argument, gives the example of wax figures, 
which illustrate the concept of unheimlich because of their 
ability to make depiction concretely indistinguishable from re-
ality: «An uncanny effect is often and easily produced when 
the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as 
when something that we have hitherto regarded as imagi-
nary appears before us in reality» (Freud, 1919: 636). This 
Rather than just «accompanying» their alter egos, 
Kantor’s mannequins are – literally – as one with them: in-
extricably linked together, old and young people, puppets 
and real human beings form an indissoluble whole which 
prevents any distinction whatsoever between them. What 
is paramount is that the mannequins give the impression of 
being «like a nonmaterial extension, a kind of additional or-
gan for the actors, who are their “masters”» (Kantor, 1975: 
111): the actors do not just carry the children, they are 
themselves the children. What is at stake is the concept of 
an image which is undistinguishable from its referent: Kan-
tor’s actor carries on stage, attached to his body, «not his 
replicant, but rather a perceivable, memorial prosthesis of 
what he has been as well as what he could be – a possible 
form of existence. Not his double, but rather his constitu-
tively missing part» (Cappelletto, 2010: 132). Mannequins 
are bio-objects insofar as they merge together two incon-
gruent elements: an inorganic thing and a living being. If the 
puppets are additional organs of the actors, the converse 
is also true, as the actors become organs of the puppets. 
The main issue is no longer to distinguish between carrier 
and carried, but to understand that such a distinction is in 
principle impossible, as the mannequins are not just similar, 
but rather identical to men. The notion of similarity gives 
way to that of identity.
This inevitably leads the audience to ask who actually 
are the mannequins: «Who are more concrete, real, living», 
the puppets or the actors? (Bablet, 1977: 30) It cannot go 
unnoticed that the actors, too, once blended together with 
their artificial counterparts, begin to move in a stiff and clearly 
mechanical way, always repeating the same jerky gestures 
and monotonous actions as if they were forced to do so be-
cause of a compulsion which is typical of marionettes more 
than human beings. To support this argument, we could ex-
amine one of the main characters in the Dead Class, the 
somnambulist prostitute who, as a child, «pretended to be a 
shop-window model, a licentious mannequin often standing 
naked publicly» (Kantor, 1983: 36), and who, once grown up, 
has become a proper mannequin performing on the stage of 
a theatre or (which to Kantor is the same) of life. The para-
doxical identity between object and person is also stressed 
by Kantor’s idea that actors, being «deceptively similar to us, 
yet at the same time infinitely foreign, beyond an impassable 
barrier» (1975: 114), are similar to corpses: both are like us, 
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These words immediately call to mind Julius von 
Schlosser’s History of Portraiture in Wax, a pioneering work 
which had traced, from both a historical and a theoretical 
point a view, the vicissitudes of «a branch of art that in our 
day is all but confined to a single specialization, one almost 
wholly sundered from the realm of “Art” as we know it, name-
ly the formally defined and valuable expression of an individ-
ual personality through technical ability; the specialization to 
which I refer is found in such places as fairground booths, 
barbershops, tailor shops» (Schlosser, 1911: 173). In order to 
correctly evaluate the meaning and importance of Schloss-
er’s masterpiece it is essential to realise the courage of its 
author and the difficulties he had to face: a few years after 
the turn of the twentieth century, one of the most illustrious 
art historians of the renowned «Wiener Schüle» decided to 
focus on the history and value of ceroplastics, a topic which 
seems definitely related to crafts and mere technical curiosity 
rather than to art. Schlosser was able to grasp and show the 
extraordinary potentialities of such a neglected material as 
statement perfectly fits Kantor’s project of breaking down the 
barriers which separate the reality of life from the (alleged) 
unreality of theatre plays.
Within this context, it also becomes immediately clear 
why Kantor resorts to such an unusual material as wax in 
order to build up his mannequins. In fact, this choice is dic-
tated by Kantor’s idea of the enigmatic nature of all objects, 
particularly those of the lowest rang:
Only the reality of the lowest order, the poorest and least pres-
tigious objects, is capable of revealing its full objectivity in a 
work of art. Mannequins and wax figures have always existed 
on the peripheries of sanctioned Culture. They were not ad-
mitted further; they occupied places in fair booths, suspicious 
magician’s chambers, far from the splendid shrines of art, 
treated condescendingly as curiosities intended for the tastes 
of the masses. For precisely this reason, it was they, and not 
academic, museum creations, which caused the curtain to 
move at the blink of an eye (Kantor, 1975: 111).
1. T. Kantor, The Dead Class. The rope and «bio-objects». © Jan Dalman. Cricoteka Archive
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pharmakon against the irrationality of emotional responses, 
Kantor’s project goes in exactly the opposite direction: the 
audience should become, literally, ingenuus – it should regain 
the ability to be natural, free from all customary practices and 
all the convictions which have transformed it in just a passive 
beholder of a work of art that can at best be described as a 
mere diversion from the seriousness of «real» life.
Being so similar to real children, the wax mannequins of 
the Dead Class are intended to provide a material expression 
to the idea that drama is a form of reality strictly connected to 
and even inseparable from everyday existence. Any bounda-
ries between the «reality» of life and the «unreality» of images 
should be overstepped:
Mannequins smell of sin, of criminal transgression. The ex-
istence of these creatures, shaped in man’s image, almost 
«godlessly», in an illegal fashion, is the result of heretical deal-
ings, a manifestation of the dark, nocturnal, rebellious side of 
human activity. Of crimes and traces of death as sources of 
knowledge. The vague and inexplicable feeling that through 
this entity so similar to a living human being but deprived 
of consciousness and purpose there is transmitted to us a 
terrifying message of death and nothingness – precisely this 
feeling become the cause of – simultaneously – that trans-
gression, repudiation, and attraction. Of prohibition and fasci-
nation (Kantor, 1975: 112).
With their «criminal transgression», wax mannequins 
challenge aesthetics as both the science of perception and 
the theory of art. As for the former, the thorny problem is 
immediately evident: Kantor regards as artistic – supremely 
artistic – objects which are usually considered among the 
most banal (if not squalid) products of a handicraft aimed 
at nothing more than a slavish imitation of reality. It is the 
age-old problem of casting, of mechanical reproduction 
which seems to preclude a priori any claim at artistic status 
(it suffices to consider the long-standing controversy as to 
whether the «photographic act» (Dubois, 1983) should be 
considered as a creative or a merely reproductive one). How-
ever, as Schlosser already maintained, «if a case is to be 
made against wax sculpture, it cannot validly proceed from 
the abstract “idea”, art as object, but must proceed from 
the subject role of the artist; not from general considerations 
relating to the “genre” as such but only from the individual 
wax – those potentialities which had already been exploited 
over the centuries by both artisans and artists, and which 
Schlosser (erroneously)3 thought were completely exhausted 
at the dawn of the twentieth century.
Kantor’s notion of theatre is based on the very similar 
attempt to give new life to objects of the lowest order, that 
is, objects which are aesthetically disregarded, but precisely 
for this reason are best suited to redraw the only seemingly 
stable boundaries between what should be considered art 
and what should not. The selection of such objects suits the 
idea of a radically new form of theatre in which any trace of 
fiction has disappeared and the distance between art and life 
is reduced to zero.
The question of the indistinguishability between images 
and reality leads us to another crucial point regarding Kan-
tor’s choice of using wax as an artistic material. Wax allows 
an extremely high degree of adherence to the models por-
trayed: it is characterized by «a viscosity, a sort of activity and 
intrinsic force, which is a force of metamorphism, polymor-
phism, imperviousness to contradiction» (Didi-Huberman, 
2008: 155). Wax proves to be the ideal substance to make 
the audience doubt of being able to find a difference, howev-
er small it may be, between appearance and reality. Thanks 
to their disturbing hyperrealism and their ability to perfectly 
reproduce the skin in (almost) all its subtlest shades and de-
tails, Kantor’s mannequins challenge the traditional idea of 
«representation», thus raising the suspicion that the images 
are not «just images», objects, or mere things, but that they 
actually concern the life itself of the models, of the originals. 
Or even that the images are the models, and that there are 
no originals at all behind or beyond them. The images blend 
with the real persons, meant as both the actors carrying the 
wax mannequins and the audience, which find themselves 
directly, personally involved in the representation [2].
Here we are dealing with that «indecisive nature of the 
boundaries between the artistic and the living» which another 
great theatre theorist, the phenomenologist José Ortega y 
Gasset (1921: 188) has discussed. Schlosser (1911: 176) 
had already used similar words: «That the work of art, and 
the portrait in particular, are alive is of course one of the most 
primitive conceits (concetti), one that naive minds confront-
ed with an artistic creation will in general most readily and 
easily adopt». However, whereas the use of the word «naive» 
reveals Schlosser’s anxiety to consider culture as a powerful 
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ject – an object which is not the real object, but instead 
its image, its «representant» (Husserl, 1904-1905: 20), its 
Stell-Vertreter, something which stands for it. Image con-
sciousness is characterized by a «mediacy» (Ibid., 25) that 
is absent from perceptual presentation. We look at the rep-
resenting image, but we see the represented object: we ap-
prehend the object through the image and thanks to the 
image. Therefore, we should properly speak of «images» if 
and only if there is a conflict [Widerstreit] – however small 
it may be – between the image itself and the represented 
object. And we must be fully aware of this conflict, which 
means that we should have no doubt, no hesitation in rec-
ognising the image as an image-of something else, some-
thing real: «If the conscious relation to something depicted 
is not given with the image, then we certainly do not have an 
image» (Husserl, 1904-1905: 32). This consciousness, this 
awareness, may only arise if, beyond and despite even the 
most accurate resemblance between representing image 
and represented object, we are still able to find some mo-
case» (Schlosser, 1911: 299). It cannot, it must not be just 
the use of a particular material which undermines the value 
of an artwork, but rather the way in which that material is 
used. Wax can surely serve a merely mimetic purpose, but 
this does not mean that the hyperrealism it allows to reach is 
necessarily unartistic. Kantor’s mannequins take full advan-
tage of the material they are made of, but their seemingly ex-
cessive degree of realism is instrumental to a theoretical plan 
aimed at radically challenging any attempt to clearly separate 
the world of art from the world of everyday life. In the Dead 
Class, realism becomes expressionism.
Concerning aesthetics as the theory of perception, 
wax puppets transgress another boundary: that between 
(real) objects and (unreal) images. Reflecting on the intricate 
distinction between perception [Wahrnehhmung] and image 
consciousness [Bildbewusstsein], Edmund Husserl argued 
that the former makes someone or something appear «in 
person [leibhaft]» (Husserl, 1911-1912: 367), whereas the 
latter does not «present», but rather «presentifies» an ob-
2. The wax mannequins of the Dead Class. © Tomislav Medak
https://www.flickr.com/photos/tomislavmedak/6169571307/in/photostream/
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jects – or, rather, both objects and subjects – wax figures 
prove to be particularly suited to infringe the boundaries be-
tween the realm of representation and that of reality, showing 
how porous and vulnerable they actually are. Together with 
the simple rope separating the stage from the audience, the 
wax children of the Dead Class remind us that theatre should 
not be reduced to mere divertissement and recreation, for 
we are directly and personally engaged in (and involved by) 
the play. The images are not at all as distant as we are ac-
customed to believe. Those children force each and every 
one of us to repeat, together with Kantor (1967: 86): «The 
question “Is this already art or is this still reality?” become 
inconsequential to me».
ments of difference: «Despite full internal coinciding, such 
moments must not be missing in any way» (Husserl, 1904-
1905: 33). Contrary to perceptual apprehension [Wahrne-
hmungsauffassung], image apprehension [Bildauffassung] 
has the characteristic of representation by means of resem-
blance, which presupposes the beholder’s ability to «see-
as», to «catch the identical in the difference» (Franzini, 2004: 
125): we must be aware of the fact that the depicting object 
is only similar to the real object depicted.
Kantor’s puppets are transgressive in the literal sense 
of the word: they are able to trans-gredi, to cross the thresh-
old between art and non art as well as between perception 
and image consciousness. Being neither objects nor sub-
Notes
1 On the fundamental link between death and images see Belting, 2001: 84-124. On the analogy between mannequins and corpses in Kantor’s theatre see 
Koch-Butryn, 2002: 8.
2 See also Andrew Bielski, «Kantor’s Waxworks: Anti-theatricalism and the personnel of the theatre», in Kobialka, Zarzecka (2015).
3 In the History of Portraiture in Wax Schlosser does not even mention either Medardo Rosso’s work or Degas’s Petite Danseuse, which was also originally 
sculpted in wax; nor could the Viennese art historian witness the ever-growing production and diffusion of artistic wax sculptures since the Sixties of the 
Twentieth-Century (see Ullrich, 2003 and Conte, 2014).
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